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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND POLICE
International police as a sanction, that is, as a means of
enforcing international law, is to-day one of the debated questions
of the world peace movement. But when people speak of inter-
national police they often fail to distinguish carefully the meaning
of the term. International police is a misnomer. What is meant
is an international army and navy, not a force of policemen,
sheriffs, or marshals in the sense in which the word is commonly
used in the United States.
International police is, however, not a new idea. It is one of
the oldest and most persistent ideas associated with the movement
for world peace. It was embodied in the Great Design of Henry
IV and in the project of William Penn for the peace of
Europe, both which propositions date back to the 17 th century.
It was part of the scheme of the Abb6 de St. Pierre, who elab-
orated early models, and was embodied in Rousseau's Project of
Perpetual Peace which antedated by a few years the outbreak of
the French Revolution. Europe has changed since those pro-
posals were made; but they may be considered as steps in the
evolution of thought about sanctions., Suffice it to say that in
general* they contemplated a European federation with armed
force to carry into effect the vote of its congress or the decision
of its court, to maintain a treaty, to punish a member who nego-
tiated a treaty adverse to the confederation, or made preparations
for war on it, took arms to resist it, or attacked one of its
members.
Early in the nineteenth century, no less a personage than Czar
Alexander I of Russia proposed to Great Britain the use of inter-
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national force as part of his plan, first for a confederation of
Europe and then of the world. While the result of the
Napoleonic wars was still in doubt, the British government was
willing to accede to a proposal to organize a collective force, but
only under a specific treaty of alliance for definite purposes, like
keeping France in order. It was unwilling to join in a standing
arrangement for the use of international coercion for the vaguely
defined or general objects of a confederation, a distinction that
it may be well to bear in mind to-day in judging the probable
attitude of Great Britain, or for that matter, of the United States
should the views of either country on international police sud-
denly be put to the test.
After the defeat of Napoleon, the Holy Alliance, consisting
mainly of Russia, Prussia and Austria, co~perated with their
military forces against uprisings of democracy in Europe and
thus disclosed that one of the chief dangers of the use of united
force is interference in the internal affairs of nations. Great
Britain was asked to join the Holy Alliance, but refused because
her statesmen saw that, while the arrangement might enable her
to intervene in the internal affairs of other European states, it
would allow the other members of the alliance to interfere in her
affairs. Her king and people were living under a parliamentary
system and preferred democracy to absolutism. The Holy
Alliance might have gone farther and put down by force of arms
revolution against Spain in South America, but was prevented
from doing so by fear of the fleet of Great Britain, which could
hinder transportation of troops on the seas, and by the promul-
gation of the Monroe Doctrine which warned Europe against
meddling in American affairs by extending her system here.
Associated thus with intervention and with the repression of
democracy by despots, the use of international police became
abhorrent to the liberal sentiments of the generation that knew the
working of the Holy Alliance, and has remained under suspicion
ever since.
The organized peace movement, which was begun at the end
of the Napoleonic Wars, has never as a whole favored coercive
sanctions. It has followed in the steps of William Ladd, founder
of the American Peace Society, and author of an Essay on a
Congress of Nations, (i84o), a work that in respect to the use
of force is typical of most modern peace projects whether pro-
posed by Europeans or Americans. William Ladd advocated a
congress for the codification of international law and a court of
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND POLICE 515
arbitration to apply the law, but behind neither congress nor court
was there a policeman. The most influential organization of
public men making for world peace, the Interparliamentary
Union, does not as a body approve the idea of inte-national
coercion.
The Hague Conferences have not adopted collective force as a
sanction to international conventions. The Hague Conference of
1907 provided certain penalties or compensations for the breaking
of rules for the conduct of warfare on land and stipulated in the
Porter-Drago convention that force should not be used to collect
contractual debts until a nation had refused to arbitrate, or hav-
ing consented to do so, declined to go on with the necessary
arbitral proceedings; but, though the right to use force as a last
resort was implied, no thought of its exercise by a union of the
nations or by any other than the aggrieved nation was intimated.
When the powers at The Hague in 19o7 expressed their conviction
that certain disputes relating to the interpretation and application
of the provisions of international agreements might be submitted
to compulsory arbitration, without restriction, no plan for the use
of force was recommended. No international army or navy is
authorized to enforce neutrality regulations relating to land or
maritime warfare. Each state is to defend its own neutrality;
so-called neutralized states like Belgium and Switzerland
whose integrity was guaranteed by some of the great powers are
not protected by specific guarantee under the Hague Conventions.
We find no mention of international force in the convention estab-
lishing the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or the draft for the
Court of Arbitral Justice, or the convention for the International
Prize Court. It was the understanding that the litigant nations
who used these courts were to carry out their decisions in good
faith and it was thought that public opinion as well as enlightened
self interest would be strong enough to constrain them to do it.
It may be said that by custom, nations, when entering upon
an arbitration, agree either expressly or impliedly to accept the
decision to be rendered if it accords with the terms of submission
though in some cases they may reserve the right to have another
hearing. Thus far no force has been required to sustain an
arbitral decision. If a decision has proved to be unacceptable,
questions left at issue have been resubmitted to arbitration, or an
adjustment of them has been made by diplomacy. But not all
cases that might have been arbitrated have been brought to court,
some of them, like the difficulty between the United States and
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Spain, in 1898, having been referred to war; and here has been
a limitation to the development of arbitration.
Such of their disputes as the nations have referred to arbitra-
tion have been submitted voluntarily in accordance with a treaty
made for the settlement of a dispute, when it has arisen, or under
a standing arbitration treaty or arbitral clause in some other kind
of treaty previously agreed to. The agreement to arbitrate is
made by nations acting in pairs, not in con66rt. It is not made
by, but outside, the Hague Conference which has established an
optional court and laid down a "code of procedure, but has not
created a compulsory jurisdiction even for this kind of treaty.
An arbitration treaty, therefore, is seen to be but the beginning
of an international jurisdiction which is now-of moral obligation,
but which, under a fully developed international government,
might also become compulsory by the sanction of force if it Were
deemed wise to adopt such sanction.
The basis upon which the world has been organized, or rather
not organized, accounts in a large measure for the fact that public
opinion has been regarded as the only practical sanction of arbi-
tral decisions for our time. In an age marked by the rise and
growth of nationalities independence has characterized the nations
in their dealings with each other. On occasion they have reso-
lutely asserted their claims by means of their own armed forces
under an assumed right of self-redress or intervention. To an
international system demanding the surrender of as much national
sovereignty as collective international compulsion would imply
they would not have agreed.
Furthermore, in this age of imperialism, nations like Great
Britain, Russia, Germany and France have been reaching out
beyond their borders to establish empires under their own flag or
to exercise their power'in self-appropriated spheres of commercial
influence in other lands, to found colonies, or to establish
self-governing dominions of their own race capable in time
of federation with the mother country. By Europe the old
balance of power theory has been extended to Asia and Africa,
each rival nation claiming privilege or territory as compensation
for another's gain. Treaties have been violated, antagonisms
provoked, suspicions aroused, alliances formed and armaments
multiplied. There has been no stability in the status quo and
very little desire to have it fixed except by nations that were satis-
fied with what possessions, trade privileges, or national rights
they had gained. No conference of responsible statesmen could
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have agreed upon a status quo. The Interparliamentary Union,
at Geneva in 1912, would not seriously consider a resolution, pro-
posed by a United States delegate, looking to a fixed status as a
starting point for the organization of a permanently peaceful
world order. The members were not ready for the recognition
of such a principle, as it was feared it would work injustice to
some races, or defeat the cherished plans of others, or conse-
crate the colonial gains of predatory states. Only an occasion has
been needed to throw a dissatisfied and agitated world into a
state of war; and the war has come.
Under such conditions, the true import of which it is easier to
see now than it was before the war, it was unreasonable to expect
the nations to put themselves in a position to be coerced by
international police; and, therefore, it was felt by some leaders
of the peace movement that the proposition to institute it was
untimely. They feared its advocacy would hinder the moderate
but steady progress that the cause of peace was making under the
Hague system.
But, though the majority of writers on international peace have
thought the sanction of public opinion and good faith to be the
most practical for the present age, several distinguished pub-
licists of our time, believing lack of armed force behind inter-
national law to be a serious defect, have proposed international
police for present use, or for use in the near future, but have
offered no detailed plans for its organization. Others have con-
sidered it an essential adjunct to an international government or
world state to be formed substantially on the model of the United
States of America whenever it can be realized, whether now or in
the distant future. Some writers have proposed internatiohal
police for the execution of Hague conventions. Others have
suggested it as a means of compelling obedience to decisions of
the Hague Court or reference of a case to it, and still others
have urged it as a substitute for rivai armies and navies, a meas-
ure of economy in armaments, or a preparation for disarmament,
and probably as a necessary preliminary to world peace. Among
Europeans who have spoken out from strong conviction on the
subject may be named Professor J. R. Seeley of Great Britain
and Professor C. Van Vollenhoven of Holland; and, among
Americans, Edwin Ginn, founder of the World Peace Foundation,
and ex-President Eliot of Harvard University.
Since the war broke out the lack of force behind international
law has been considered by many publicists more than ever before
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to be a fatal defect which should be remedied. Of proposals
made before the war, that of Professor Van Vollenhoven was
the most widely discussed, while of those made since the war,
that of the League to Enforce Peace is the most popular. Viewed
from the standpoint of American interests, policies and insti-
tutions, a brief examination of the proposals of Professor
Van Vollenhoven and of the League to Enforce Peace with some
consideration of the proposal for a United States of the World,
will enable one to see some of the problems underlying the ques-
tion of the practicability or desirability of putting force behind
the law of nations and of committing the United States now to a
permanent arrangement for collective enforcement of the law.
PROFESSOR VAN VOLLENHOVEN'S PLAN
Professor Van Vollenhoven, distinguished jurist, member of
the faculty of Leyden University, made his proposition to the
Universal Peace Congress at The Hague in 1913. His proposal
was not adopted, but by resolution was made a subject for study
by future peace congresses. Although it has been frequently
discussed in pacifist circles in Europe, it is not well known here,
where it deserves more attention fromi Americans than it has
received.
Professor Van Vollenhoven did not attempt a minute elab-
oration of his plan, but gave sufficient outline to indicate its
nature. He did not propose a universal state, or a United States
of the World, which he considered a Utopian idea; but believed
that a community of nations might and should be organized now,
with force behind it, under the Hague system; and he advised
that to the Preparatory Committee for the Third Hague Con-
ference, but not to suspicious and embarrassed foreign offices,
the task be given to initiate a scheme for the use of international
police.
He advocated the formation at first of a group of four or six
great powers, together with some small powers, but finally
enlarged to include more or all of the family of nations. This
group of powers should have a police force at its service to be
placed under the control of a board of admirals who could
summon and command national contingents without permission of
foreign offices. Eventually, however, it should have a completely
internationalized army and navy. The board of admirals
should be empowered to act independently in an emergency, or
eventually, in a doubtful case, upon the orders of the Hague
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Court or projected courts or a delegation of one of them. He
would begin by enforcing the Hague Conventions, for example,
the Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War, which, when violated, is now expected to
be executed by aggrieved individual nations; but later, he would
include treaties of guarantee, treaties of permanent neutrality,
other treaties not provided with express sanction of force, and
finally arbitral awards; that is, he would enforce codified law at
first, and complex matters afterward. But the law itself should
first be made by the nations in the combination; it should how-
ever be adopted with their consent, not arbitrarily imposed. And
nations, if they desired, should be allowed to withdraw from the
association after a stated period of years.
If the Preparatory Committee elaborated such a plan, without
attempting to organize a federal state, but only a community of
nations, and safeguarded the authority granted, Professor Van
Vollenhoven thought that the nations would accept it, and that
if they accepted it, they might be as certain that there would be
no more danger of usurpation by the police executives than by
the Hague Court, from which no abuse of authority is feared.
By such plan the nations would not lose their sovereignty, but
rather would gain a new sense of security by having the protection
of the union. By the proposed plan, the police power should be
made strong enough to cope with countries as powerful as Great
Britain and Germany. Thus in a dangerous situation interna-
tional police would have a preventive effect and be like the angel
with drawn sword standing before the gates of Paradise.
The advantage of the sanction of police would be the substitu-
tion of the international will for the arbitrary will of individual
powers; of its enforcement by a group of these instead of one
of them; and of an impartial decision for decisions dictated as
at present by selfish considerations on the part of the powers.
In the opinion of Professor Van Vollenhoven international police
would be a prerequisite to the limitation of armaments. It would
be the only rampart behind which the powers would dare to dis-
arm. It would also tend to create confidence in the Hague con-
ferences, which it was feared might wane if they should devote
themselves to technical detail, instead of attending to their greater
duty which was to organize the community of nations. The
institution of an international police, however, need not diminish
the moral means now being tried for making peace; the arbitra-
tion movement at The Hague should go on; and sanctions like
the boycott might also be considered.
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As to the difficult problem of the status quo, that might be
remedied by agreement or fixed arbitrarily; but first persuasion
with dissatisfied powers might be tried, compensations promised,
and an attempt made to bring within the law of nations every-
thing that might help to secure a peaceful agreement. The
powers, he believed, however, would not seriously seek juridical
methods of settlement so long as they could accomplish their
desires by force of arms; or until the nations were organized.
Organization, even the least of it, would tend to do away with
their double conscience, one for domestic, the other for foreign
affairs, which often characterizes international life to-day.
In justifying his plan, Professor Van Vollenhoven gave some
precedents of the use of international force in past years. He
stated that international compulsion was exercised in 1831 and
1832 upon the Netherlands; in 1856, in the Crimean War when
France and England defended the rights of Turkey from the
attack of Russia; in 1862, in Mexico when a combination of
European nations went there; in 1881, in a naval demonstration
before Dulcigno; in 19oo, when an international expedition went
to Peking; in 1902, against Venezuela where pressure was
exerted by the fleets of Germany, England and Italy, and, in 1913,
before Antivari. He called attention to the provision for use of
force that had been made concerning guarantees and permanent
neutrality on the part of states that had become sureties, for
example, in the treaty of April, 1856, between France, England
and Austria, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other, by which
the three countries promised armed assistance against infraction
of thetreaty of Paris. He also made mention of the fragmentary
and comparatively insignificant international sanctions or com-
pensations that appear in the Hague conventions to which allusion
has already been made.
THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE
The League to Enforce Peace, initiated by Hamilton Holt,
William B. Howland, Theodore Marburg, and others at a meeting
held in New York City in January, 1915, was organized in Inde-
pendence Hall, Philadelphia, June 17, 1915, with Hon. William
H. Taft, as president, President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard
University as chairman of its executive committee, and William
H. Short as secretary. Its platform is as follows:
It is desirable for the United States to join a league of
nations binding the signatories to the following:
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First: All justiciable questions arising between the sig-
natory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to
the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tri-
bunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and
upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.
Second: All other questions arising between the signa-
tories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to
a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration and
recommendation.
Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forth-
with both their economic and military forces against any
one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of
hostility, against another of the signatories before any
question arising shall be submitted as provided in the
foregoing.
Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers
shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify
rules of international law, which, unless some signatory
shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall there-
after govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal men-
tioned in Article One.
This. programme' is as suggestive as it is concise. It is a
political platform calling for action; not a mere resolution of
sentiment. It proposes that the United States become a member
of a league of nations. The nations that would be our copartners
are not named, but we may learn who they are from explanation
of the plan of the League to Enforce Peace in the speeches of
its leaders.
From a speech of Mr. Taft it is inferred that only great powers
would be members of the league of nations at the start; small
powers would probably be glad to become included for the sake
of protection, but no opportunity would be given for a disconcert-
ing dispute to arise over the relative equality of great and small
states.
From a speech of Mr. Marburg it is gathered that the member-
ship of the League would be made up at first of only progressive
nations. These are "the eight great powers,-including the
United States,--the secondary powers of Europe, and the 'A B C'
countries of ,South America." "In -this group," says Mr. Mar-
burg, "we find three great peoples with common political aspi-
rations, namely, those of Great Britain, France and the United
States, peoples which no longer regard democracy as a passing
phase of political experiment, but as a permanent fact of politics.
We find in it two powerful nations, Great Britain and the United
States, which may be said to be satisfied territorially. We find,
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moreover, a group of smaller nations with no disturbing ambi-
tions. It is believed that if such a league could be formed sub-
stantial justice would emerge from its united action just as under
the Federal Government substantial justice results to the forty-
eight states, originally sovereign entities, now composing the
American Union."
From a speech by Professor John Bates Clark, who thinks
that ultimately there should be a consolidated European state,
but recognizes the likelihood of the continuance for a time, in
a balance of power, of the present combinations of European
powers which must necessarily adopt protective measures against
each other and keep at peace within themselves for the future,
it is learned that the Entente with its nine or more members has
"important qualifications" for becoming such a league of peace
as is suggested-"a commonwealth of nations-powerful enough
to preserve peace and vitally interested in doing it." Professor
Clark does not definitely advise that the United States join either
the Entente or the Alliance, but believes that "with the Alliance
and the Entente continuing and a league of neutral countries
existing the situation will be ripe for creating the type of union
that shall have all needed qualities and can give to both continents
that lasting peace for the sake of which the countries of Europe
are impoverishing and depopulating themselves."
The platform of the League to Enforce Peace like the plan of
Professor Van Vollenhoven, recognizes two principal kinds of
international controversies, but classifies them-in the words
of Mr. Taft, as,-
Ist: Issues that can be decided on principles of inter-
national law and equity, called justiciable.
2nd: Issues that cannot be decided on such principles
of law and equity, but which might be quite as irritating
and provocative of war, called non-justiciable.
In the first class are such questions as the Alaskan boundary,
the Bering Sea Seal Fisheries, and the Alabama Claims; in the
second class would be questions such as whether Japanese should
be naturalized, or whether all American citizens should be admit-
ted to Russia as merchants without regard to religious faith,
questions that, in the absence of a treaty on the subject, are com-
pletely within the international right of a nation imposing
restrictions, and cannot be settled by a court.
The judicial tribunal to which a case not settled by negotiation
is submitted would not only decide it upon its merits, but would
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be empowered to decide whether or not it was justiciable or
within the jurisdiction of the court, and, if not, refer it to a coun-
cil of conciliation to investigate, confer, hear argument, and
recommend a compromise. Although matters of jurisdiction as
they have come up have been incidentally determined by arbitra-
tion tribunals, acting for two parties, an advance would here
be made by conferring this power upon a court explicitly in a
permanent agreement applying to members of a league of nations.
A court of international justice is a familiar ideal, now in process
of realization at The Hague and, therefore, though details of its
structure may be debatable, there is nothing new about it. The
council of conciliation which is provided for the solution of all
other kinds of questions, which are not settled by negotiation,
would be a new institution, but would combine in its fundtions
the attributes of mediation and an international commission of
inquiry, both which are established in principle in the Hague
system. The council of conciliation, however, would not only
bring the parties together and provide for an investigation; but
would make a recommendation as to the solution of a difficulty.
The authority to make a recommendation is an extension beyond
that given in the Hague plan for a commission of inquiry which
is supposed to confine itself to a report on facts, though in the
Dogger Bank case, between Great Britain and Russia, the com-
mission was allowed to fix responsibility.
The League to Enforce Peace also provides for the holding
of international conferences to codify law which the court shall
apply to cases unless the dissent of one of the signatory powers
is made known within a stated period. There thus would be both
codified and judge-made law; for in applying the law to a case
the court would naturally develop legal principles. Therefore
by this plan in the end a system of international justice would
be established which ought to inspire confidence in pacific
methods of settlement on the part of the nations. And when we
have built up confidence in international justice-we are, says
President Lowell, "at least on the path to that Utopia which
we all long for."
To this arrangement for judicial decision by a court and inves-
tigation by a council of conciliation is added the provision for
the use of force as a sanction. This feature of it, like the Van
Vollenhoven plan, is a distinct departure from the usual projects
of peace organizations and from the present methods of the
Hague system.
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It would seem that provision is here made for international
police in the sense of the collective use of armies and navies of
the different 'nations that compose the League, each nation, pre-
sumably, contributing its contingent, or at least being represented
in the combination by military or naval force, but the term
international police is not used by the League. On the contrary,
by some of its leaders the term, construed as meaning a permanent
federal force, is rejected on the ground that it is impractical in
this stage of the world's history; but possibly this distinction is
too finely drawn, as international police includes both ideas.
The term "economic force," which is also a part of the pressure
to be brought to bear, would seem to include boycott or non-
intercourse, but neither of these terms is used.in the platform of
the League to Enforce Peace, though non-intercourse is
advocated by -Edward A. Filene and other members of the
League.
Economic pressure in the form of increased tariffs on the goods
of states that refuse to come to court or obey a decision was
proposed by Leon Bollack to the international peace congress at
Geneva in 1912, but was referred back by that body for further
study. Non-intercourse is also to be related to military force in
the form of blockade, siege and prohibition against trading with
the enemy and is a subject which deserves treatment by itself.
A limitation of space forbids treating non-intercourse at this time.
Economic pressure, it will be observed, is mentioned before mili-
tary power; and it has been conceded by some of the representa-
tives of the League to Enforce Peace that it ought to be tried
first, though, according to the platform, both may or shall be used
at the same time. And these sanctions are to be used "forth-
with" by the signatories "against any one of their number that
goes to war, or commits acts of hostility against another of the
signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as
provided in the foregoing" articles.
There will be no undue delay by calling a council for deliber-
ation after hostilities have been committed. But though force is
provided for, some of the leaders of the League to Enforce Peace
think that it would seldom have to be applied. It is conceivable
that a case might be held under advisement by the court or coun-
cil for a year. If war threatened, there would be time for par-
ties in a country who oppose war, but are at first usually
suppressed, to make themselves heard, and allow an interval for
excited public passions to cool off. This is also expected to be
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the result under the Bryan plan which by agreement precludes a
declaration of war or an act of hostility while a case is pending.
"What we are aiming at, therefore," says President Lowell, "is
to delay war for a year, during which the cause can be pleaded
before the bar of the public and the bar of a tribunal." If there
is delay for a year there may be no war at all. The belligerent
nature of the plan which its name suggests is limited and the
function of investigation honored. It is also believed that if there
is certainty that collective force will be used in case of an infrac-
tion of the obligation of the League by beginning hostile action
before resorting to the court or council, that very potentiality will
operate as a deterrent from war.
Like the Van Vollenhoven plan, the proposal of the League to
Enforce Peace does not attempt to create a universal state or a
United States of the World nor does it establish the status of an
international citizen which is usually implied in a world state.
The League to Enforce Peace does not in terms propose an inter-
national executive, nor make provision for raising money to pay
its debts, but if the projected sanctions are to be carried out or
have potential value we are doubtless expected to assume the
existence of an international executive with ample incidental
powers to perform its duty. The platform of the League to
Enforce Peace does not elaborate the machinery of economic boy-
cott or military organization. It does not require a limitation of
armaments, but is consistent with preparedness for national
defense. It does not prohibit alliances between member states.
In the words of Mr. Taft, who, like President Lowell, has by
his confident appeals won many adherents to the plan of the
League, the society is made up neither of "peace-at-any-price"
men "nor militarists or jingoes," but of men who "are trying to
follow a middle and practical path."
To sum up, then, the aim of the society is the formation of a
league of nations limited in its membership, provided with a con-
ference for the codification of law, together with a court of justice
and a council of conciliation, its members obligated to use their
economic and military forces against a nation that breaks the
peace.
The League, if it should be based on neutrals and the Entente
powers, but with the Teutonic powers left out, would seem to
be in form a great alliance, but, if both the Teutonic and the
Entente powers were included, it would be a confederation, i. e.,
an association of governments, not of peoples.
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PROBLEMS THAT BESET PLANS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE
Though we may accept the principle that there should be force
behind international law and agree that collective coercion would
be an improvement upon national self-help, whether in the asser-
tion of rights or the prevention of aggression, questions arise as
to what kind of organization of the nations should precede the
authorization of the use of force and how it should be applied.
Critics of the League to Enforce Peace may fairly say that it
ought to develop a plan for an executive and not leave it merely
to be assumed. How and under what officers are the military
forces to be organized or economic pressure concerted? And
what will happen if any of the members refuse to respond to the
call of the league, or actually join the belligerent state? If the
league is a confederation, how will money be obtained from its
members to prosecute a war? Must each contribute its share or
give what it chooses to give or pay according to its means? Must
the league beg, or requisition its money for expenses, if it has
any, in time of peace? Can these be legally or successfully
exacted by compulsion from sovereign states as entities, there
being no apparent intention to tax individual citizens?
Likewise, critics of the Van- Vollenhoven plan may also fairly
say that the idea of making a board of admirals the executive,
even in conjunction with a court, would be objectionable.
Should not the admirals be placed under a supreme civil execu-
tive power and the court be expected to apply to it for help?
Should not this executive power, acting under legal limitations,
have discretion to act or not on the report of the court?
The scope of these two coercive plans differs. The proposal
of Professor Van Vollenhoven is progressive. By it force sup-
ports codified law first, and then in the far future other matters.
The League to Enforce Peace is limited in its scope. Touching
directly a defeat of the arbitration system, the League confines
itself to inducing an aggrieved state to bring its case before the
court or council; but the question might fairly arise whether it
is enough simply to discipline a state for committing an act of
hostility before submitting to an investigation and what the moral
effect on enlistments would be when it was known that the
decision of the court or council, should it be rendered, would not
be enforced. Would it be right for the law of the league to
permit a dissatisfied litigant state to attack another state that had
joined in submitting its case to a court or a council and secured
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judgment? In case of an infraction of the obligation previously
to submit a case to investigation, how are we to be certain which
side begins hostilities that shall warrant the application of
coercion "forthwith"?
Judged by American experience, would it not be safe, within
the bounds of present day statesmanship, and also in accord with
the evolution of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes, which now permits notification by a
state to the bureau of the Hague Court of willingness to arbitrate
a question, to arrange for a judgment by default or ex parte hear-
ing after summons and not attempt to go farther? In a contro-
versy between two states of the American Union, if there were a
refusal to come to court on the part of one of them, it would be
given time to get into a riglht frame of mind and no hostile action
by the absentee would be likely to follow.
Thus far there has been no occasion to enforce arbitral
decisions, and, therefore, it may not be necessary now to create
machinery for their enforcement. In any event, before it is
decided to authorize the Hague Court itself to use force, which
is a favorite plan of some publicists as well as a suggestion of
Professor Van Vollenhoven, we should do well to be cautious.
The possible political consequences of a decision rendered by an
international court should be taken into account. The Dred Scott
decision on slavery in the United States, which is considered a
forerunner of the Civil War, in which the national government
finally fought against the political doctrine of the decision, which
was at first applied to an individual, is a warning ag to what, under
an extraordinary temptation, an international court might try
to do in deciding a controversy vitally related to the future policy
of the society of nations, say in a question between the European
polity and that of the United States. To give such a court power
over armies and navies might enable it to impose an undesirable
political system on our people or the peoples of this hemisphere
and imperil the political foundations of the international order as
well as our own. The best sanction of the decision of a court
is not the fear that it inspires, but the justice that it declares.
This will be realized all the better when a regular judicial court
is established which has as its guide not the many and sometimes
confusing sources of law, the decisions, text-writers, treaties, and
customs of to-day; but an explicit code of laws consented to
by the nations. And then behind this the best reliance may be
an educated international public which, as in the United States,
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is accustomed to respect a federal supreme court. Here decisions
of controversies between states or between the states and the
Federal Government do not have to be enforced either by the
military arm or by the boycott, but are solved by the mental
forcefulness of the judiciary, whose reasoned opinions have
helped to establish the federal system in the confidence of the
people. Again, in any international system of justice based upon
the experiences of the United States, which advocates of coercion
ought carefully to examine, not only must the elements of time
and of patience be counted upon as factors in the solution of
questions between the federal court or executive and a state, but
the provision for constitutional amendment for the purpose of
qualifying rights as in the case of Chisolm v. Georgia when
Georgia, defeated in a suit by a citizen, was defiant; or for legis-
lative compromise as in the dispute between the United States
and South Carolina over the right of nullification of a federal
law, by a state, when the action of Congress in meeting the diffi-
culty was probably more effectual than the threat of executive
coercion, and for the time served the purpose both of doing
justice and keeping the peace.
The question is brought up by both the European and the
American plans, wheth'er it is best to organize at first a league
of some nations, or to begin with a plan that includes the mem-
bership of all of them, say the forty-six that were invited to The
Hague in 19o7. Would not either plan, in this respect, be retro-
gressive compared with the inclusiveness of the Hague plan? If
by any plan adopted the United States should become a party to
an association of nations that repudiated the doctrine of the
equality of nations, objection might come from our Latin Ameri-
can neighbors. It will be remembered that they so steadfastly
maintained the doctrine of the equality of nations at The Hague,
in 19o7, that it was impossible to agree upon a method of
appointing a board of judges for the Court of Arbitral Justice
without giving small states equal recognition with the large
states. If a league, of which the United States were a part,
were formed and only Argentina, Brazil, and Chile of the Latin
American States were considered sufficiently civilized to belong
to it, might not the question arise as to what would be the effect
of this exclusive action on public opinion in other states of
Latin America toward the United States as well as the league?
What would be the fate of those countries left outside the league?
Would they not fear that they were to be exploited? Would they
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not ask if they were now to become colonies or imperial territory,
after already being recognized as states under the protection for
nearly a century of the Monroe Doctrine? Might they not be
anxious lest they should become objects of intervention by the
league, according to the plan of the Holy Alliance? And what
would become of the Monroe Doctrine if Europe were permitted,
practically though indirectly, to compel the arbitration or media-
tion of American questions? The movement might be declared
inconsistent with the present agitation in the United States to
form a more real Pan-American Union than we now have con-
centrated in the bureau at Washington. Or again it might be
said that if the government of the United States joined a league
of European nations in the present chaotic state of boundaries
and the conflict. of imperial ambitions it would commit itself to
the principle of the balance of power, from which we have always
held aloof, and that, instead of helping to preserve peace or to
enjoy it ourselves we should get into war sooner than if we
remained in isolation. And it is pointed out that this might
have been the case had the United States been in a league whose
principles would have called for collective military action in con-
sequence of the hostilities that followed after refusal to arbitrate
the issue between Austria and Servia in 1914.
In determining upon a policy for the United States for the
present day, would not the wisest plan be to co-operate, if need
be, with other nations in the use of force for the preservation of
public safety, in a specific emergency like the Boxer rebellion as
it arises; but be in a position to withdraw when we consider
the purpose sufficiently fulfilled, without taking the obligations
of an alliance with all its possible entanglements? But if in far
distant days, as common conceptions of government and habits
of thought are developed, we should enter into a permanent
arrangement, would it not probably be better to make coercion
only an adjunct to a ,completely organized international govern-
ment, with legislative, judicial and executive departments, placed
under legal limitations, with checks and balances on the depart-
ments and especially upon the military power which, for most
purposes, should be under the orders of the elected civil author-
ities, -who by means of a representative system should be ulti-
mately responsible to the people? This form of organization
would help to ensure democratic control and tend to avoid
imperial despotism. This of course would mean a world state
or a United States of the World, with humanity at its base. It
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would indeed spell Utopia, but it would point the way to justice,
security and peace.
But how could an international government built after the
model of the United States adjust and operate the sanction of
international police? What might happen to this country, what
should we have to give up, if we tried to extend our own prin-
ciples of organization to the world order? What would be the
advantages and disadvantages? As a practical matter, it may
seem idle to ask such questions at this time, but an answer
cannot help being suggestive to those who propose federation.
In a federation, not necessarily in exact imitation of, but some-
what like, that of the United States under the Constitution-the
very fact of union would be strong sanction in itself. An
association of friendly states which, in effect, voluntarily restrict
their sovereignty and renounce war between themselves or with
the federal government, though not the use of force for local or
federal protection, would be a good and probably an essential
foundation for peace. With this there would naturally go a
limitation upon national standing armies or navies in times of
peace. But even more important for justice as well as peace
than too much or too little reliance upon force would be pacific
machinery for settling controversies, a congress to deal with
political questions, and a court with subordinate or special juris-
dictions to attend to judicial questions, and an executive acting
under legal limitations, to carry out the international objects of
the federation.
But in a federation, there would have to be a fixed status quo.
Agreement as to border lines or changes in them would have to
be made. There could be no more territorial ambitions on the
part of states, but some retrocessions or readjustments of terri-
tory would have to be made by judicial determination or consent.
There might be an international domain or federal zones in back-
ward countries administered by an international government,
capable, if possible, of development into states as civilization
advances. There would have to be an abandonment of alliances.
There could be no such thing as a shifting balance of power-
the bane of the present world system, the continuance of which
means periodic wars, with horrible slaughter, taxation, load of
debt, and injury of commerce. There would doubtless have
to be a bill of rights for nations as well as men-signs of which
have, however, begun to appear in the declaration of publicists,
like the declaration of the American Institute of International
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Law, and in the preamble of the Hague conventions. There would
have to be a guarantee of the integrity and internal autonomy
of states, with a check on domestic revolutions except by legal
means, a beginning of which is being made in the relations of the
United States with Latin American countries, while the problem
of securing the rights of peoples as well as of the governments
of states or their rulers would have to be met reciprocally as it
was not met by the one-sided and repressive measures of the
Holy Alliance.
The theory of the use of coercion in a union like that of the
United 'States raises another question of procedure when we
compare it with the theory of the Van Vollenhoven and the
League plans. These plans, contemplating an association only of
governments, but not of peoples, depart widely from the concep-
tion of force in this country. They apply it to organized states
and not to citizens. Our government is-a government that deals,
within its sphere, directly with the individual. It does not
primarily conceive of the use of force against states in their
sovereign capacity with all their powers of organized resistance.
And it might be difficult if not impossible without a great war,
which we desire to avoid, for a league of nations to use its mili-
tary and naval forces for federal execution against strong
powers like Great Britain and Germany, and perhaps their allies,
especially without a previous limitation of armaments, upon
which neither the Van Vollenhoven or the League plan insists,
though it is encouraged by the former. Such a theory might,
however, be applied under the German Constitution which is more
confederate in its character than ours and, in this respect, might
have to be taken as a model for a confederation of the govern-
ments of nations, though whether federal execution would work
successfully in the German Empire against military Prussia if
she became recalcitrant is a question as yet undecided. Our
federal force, when used, is or may be directed against
individuals who violate the laws of the Union, or rebel against
the government of the United States, or take possession of its
property, interfere with intersfate commerce or the mails, or do
various unlawful acts that are specified in statutes, relating to
public lands, the Indians, neutrality, etc. The thought behind
our government, having as its crowning feature a Supreme Court
and a system of subordinate tribunals empowered to interpret and
enforce the Constitution and the laws, is that it is a government
of law and not of men, a coercion of law and not of arms, which,
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shall we not say, is different from the traditional European and
Asiatic idea? Within our confines military force is used with
reference to the support of public peace when the police or mar-
shals of courts fail in the execution of the laws. Under our
system, the innocent are not to be confused and punished with
the guilty; we do not act at the start against whole populations,
but select the real offenders against the law.
But, in an emergency, for purposes of suppressing rebellion,
our system is elastic, and, in this respect, our experience is a
valuable study for the nations as well as a caution to ourselves
in considering whether and how we want to obligate our country
now to a system of international police. Under our system, if a
rebellion becomes strong enough the government may operate as
if at war with foreign enemies and consider its opponents, even
its own citizens, all the people within the borders of insurrec-
tionary districts, as territorial or practically foreign enemies. If
our system were applied to the nations, their rulers, if loyal, in
time of war would be agents of the federal government, but the
international authorities could, if necessary, pass over the heads
of nations and lay hands on the national forces (cf. the Van
Vollenhoven plan) and utilize both the federal and national
forces in defense of the federation, or of one of its constituent
nations in case of invasion or insurrection. If, following out
another conception of ours, that the law of the Union can be
enforced on every foot of American soil, if there could be an
international federation with an international citizenship this doc-
trine might be applied not only in the protection of property, or
interstate commerce, but by extension in defense of the rights of
a human being of whatever race or condition anywhere in the
world, and this might become a world benefit.
Under such a system as ours, if it were applied to the family of
nations, there could probably be no exclusive control by any
nation of a waterway like the Panama Canal, or the Dardanelles.
Commerce would have to become internationalized and placed
under international control. Tariff barriers, exclusive national
spheres of influence, and concessions, which are recognized causes
of friction and wars, notably of this European War, would have
to be given up.
While the use of all seas, bays, rivers and harbors would be
free in times of peace, an international fleet would, if it could,
stop all commerce with the enemy in time of war. There could
be no neutrality among the nations. A nation or people would
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have to be for or against the international authority in time of
war. If by violence the people of a nation opposed the federal
authority the penalty might be war, non-intercourse, blockade,
confiscations, the deprivation of important civil rights that are
protected in time of peace, and punishments involving death or
imprisonment of leading rebels. After a war, according to our
practice, nations might be considered conquered provinces and
occupied and administered under military governments until
restored to their relations in the union-a form of intervention,
however, that was hateful to the Southern States after our Civil
War and would probably also be to the rest of the United States
or any other country that had to endure it.
A mere glance at these propositions with which we in this
country have become familiar by experience is enough to show,
in view of present world conditions, how far the nations, either
ours or those of Europe, Latin America or Asia, with their
variety of governments, different degrees of civilization, and
cross purposes are ready for complete federation. Would Great
Britain give up her control of the seas and expose herself and her
colonies to peril? Would Germany, except under pressure of
defeat, give up the right to have as efficient an army as she wants
or to have colonies for her surplus people and products? Would
Russia give up her imperial ambitions to extend her sway?
Would France and Italy curtail their plans for expansion?
Would the old countries recognize the open door and surrender
their trade privileges in Africa or Asia? Would Japan agree to
confine herself to her present limits? Would the United States
give up the Monroe Doctrine? Would we remove our tariff bar-
riers? Would we admit all races to our territory in any number?
Would we-ought we-without constitutional guarantees of the
strongest kind to throw into the scale of international politics
our conception of sovereignty in the people for sovereignty in
kings or parliaments against which our vhole system from the
Revolution down is a protest? Would not there be an inevitable
clash if democracies, monarchies and empires should try to live
under the coercion of police, manipulated politically by the
strongest, possibly at first, by the reactionary powers? Until
changes come over the imperial drearps of other nations that are
not democracies, or, shall we venture to say, until we of the
United States are ready to make what are now impossible sacri-
fices, or better still, until the world has by disgust of war, waste
and commercial competition, worked out for itself a better system
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than that of uriregulated nationalism; until, as in the case of the
United States in 1787, economic and political necessities compel
the acceptance of what are now ideals-we shall have to wait
for a United States of the World, an international arrangement
like that proposed by Professor Van Vollenhoven, or possibly
also, for a league of nations pledged to enforce peace.
In a word, an arrangement for international police or any kind
of plan for an international force other than for temporary pur-
poses presents very great difficulties-and in one sense a dilemma.
Without world federation it looks impractical, and world feder-
ation at the present time is impossible. International police must
be further studied before it can be adopted. Without American
help, the European War will undoubtedly facilitate somewhat
the solution of the problem by preparing Europe, though possibly
only Central Europe at first, according to the results achieved by
the Teutonic powers, 'for federalism with perhaps coercion in
some form. Rulers and statesmen of Europe may see the light, or,
if they do not, the people of Europe may, and a better organization
of the European nations, or in any case constructive measures
ftr their good from which the whole world will also profit will
be adopted. A more co-operative spirit, a deeper respect for
legal methods of settling disputes will prevail.
After the war, the nations may go back for a time to the balance
of power, but we should expect that after some interval the
Hague conferences would be resumed. By many students of
international relations these are now considered the historic basis
of the future world order. The present Court of Arbitration is
likely to develop in time into a tribunal or several kinds of
tribunals with a permanent personnel possibly representing a
judicial union of some or all of the nations; and the function of
mediation may be enlarged and become judicative; the diplo-
matic conference at The Hague may in time become a political
world congress. This conference may be expected to leave, when
they are completed, codes for the prevention of war, mediation,
commissions of inquiry, arbitration, the regulation of war, and
the rights and duties of neutrals, subjects hitherto chiefly con-
sidered, and then advance to the consideration of a limited class
of measures for the common social welfare. When this trans-
formation comes legislation may be made by delegates who are
instructed not merely by governments, but to a large extent by
the peoples as to their fundamental political needs. As the
Hague system responds to the needs of the peoples, as it mani-
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festly promotes commerce, gives security to property, improves
the condition of labor and defends individual rights as well as
the rights of nations and races, it will grow in public confidence,




New England Department of
The American Peace Society.
BOSTON, MASS.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
For the text of Professor Van Vollenhoven's Plan for an International
Police, see THE PEACE MOVEMENT (Berne), June i5th, and July 15th,
1913. Also THE OFFICIAL BuLLEIN of the 22d Universal Peace Con-
gress, 1913, where there is a discussion of the plan.
For extensive references see Extra-Blad, VREDE DOOR REcHT, May-June,
1915; published at The Hague.
For an exposition of the plan of the League to Enforce Peace, see
THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEAcE, American Branch, 5o5 (now 7o) Fifth
Avenue, New York, 1915, and various articles in newspapers and maga-
zines. See also current articles in the ADVOCATE OF PEACE, Washington,
1915-1916.
A suggestive book on the subject is THE CONFEDERATION OF EUROPE
by Walter Alison Phillips, London, 1914.
THE USE OF THE ARMY IN AID OF THE CIVIL PowER by G. Norman
Lieber, Washington, i8gS, is very useful. See also the works of Winthrop
and Ballantine on this general topic.
Historic plans for the organization of nations with or without coercion
will be found in Darby's INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, London, 194o. See
also Bridgman's WoRLD ORGANIZATION and Trueblood's FEDERATION OF
THE WORLD; and consult Burgess, Willoughby and others on the Consti-
tution, Whiting's WAR PowERs UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, and similar
works.
